华枫论坛因为服务器“物理性”损伤，丢失了2018-2013年的历史记录。但好在谷歌有个网页快照功能，记录了一些历史的痕迹。
以下为网络考古抢救性发掘后找到的一些历史资料。
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张三的四
Jul 22nd, 2015, 13:01
原文链接
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n14/slavoj-zizek/sinicisation
原文作者 齐泽克
先贴出"伦敦书评"的英文原文，然后逐句翻译成中文
Sinicisation 中国化
Slavoj Žižek 齐泽克
When Alain Badiou claims that democracy is our fetish, this statement is to be taken in the precise Freudian sense, not just to mean that we elevate democracy into an untouchable Absolute. ‘Democracy’ is the last thing we see before confronting the ‘lack’ constitutive of the social field, the fact that ‘there is no class relationship,’ the trauma of social antagonism. When confronted with the reality of domination and exploitation, of brutal social struggle, we say, ‘Yes, but we have democracy!’ as if that were enough to ensure that we can resolve or at least regulate struggle, preventing it from exploding. An exemplary case of democracy as fetish is provided by such bestsellers and blockbusters as The Pelican Brief or All the President’s Men, in which a couple of ordinary guys uncover a scandal that reaches all the way to the president, eventually forcing him to step down. Corruption is everywhere in these stories, yet their ideological impact lies in their upbeat takeaway message: what a great democratic country this is where a couple of ordinary guys like you and me can bring down the mightiest man on earth!
当阿兰·巴迪欧宣称“民主是我们的怪癖”时，这句话应该在最标准的佛洛伊德心理学范畴内理解，而不是仅仅理解为我们已经把民主上升到了一个不可触及的“绝对真理”的高度。“民主”是我们的最后一招（当面对社会结构性的“缺失”，当面对“阶级关系不存在”的事实，当面对社会内部斗争所造成的创伤时）。当面对现实中的统治与剥削，面对残酷的社会纠纷时，我们会说“好吧，但是我们还有民主！”好像只要有了“民主”作为保证，我们就可以解决问题或至少可以控制各种纠纷，阻止矛盾的激化。“民主怪癖化”最好的例子就是畅销小说或电影，比如《塘鹅暗杀令》或《惊天大阴谋》。 情节大都是几个普通人发现了一桩丑闻，不断发掘直到总统，最终导致总统下台。在这些故事里，社会中的腐败无所不在，但这些电影的意识形态冲击力体现在其高调的，外卖式的潜台词：多么伟大的民主国家啊，你我这些普通人也可以把皇帝拉下马！“
This is why it is so inappropriate to give a radical new political movement a name that combines socialism and democracy: it combines the ultimate fetish of the existing world order with a term that blurs the key distinctions. Everyone can be a socialist today, even Bill Gates: it suffices to profess the need for some kind of harmonious social unity, for a common good and for the care of the poor and downtrodden. As Otto Weininger put it more than a hundred years ago, socialism is Aryan and communism is Jewish.
所以，如果我们给某种激进和新兴的运动一个名字，一个把社会主义和”民主“结合起来的名字，这种起名字的行为就是非常不合适的。一旦我们给了这种运动名字，我们就把对”已有的世界秩序“的终极变态癖好和界线模糊的术语融合在了一起。任何人都可以是个社会主义者，包括比尔盖茨：（微软的存在）为了社会和谐一体，为了大众利益，为了穷苦与被压迫的民众。奥托·魏宁格一百多年前说过：社会主义是雅利安式的，共产主义是犹太式的。
An exemplary case of today’s ‘socialism’ is China, where the Communist Party is engaged in a campaign of self-legitimisation which promotes three theses: 1) Communist Party rule alone can guarantee successful capitalism; 2) the rule of the atheist Communist Party alone can guarantee authentic religious freedom; and 3) continuing Communist Party rule alone can guarantee that China will be a society of Confucian conservative values (social harmony, patriotism, moral order). These aren’t simply nonsensical paradoxes. The reasoning might go as follows: 1) without the party’s stabilising power, capitalist development would explode into a chaos of riots and protests; 2) religious factional struggles would disturb social stability; and 3) unbridled hedonist individualism would corrode social harmony. The third point is crucial, since what lies in the background is a fear of the corrosive influence of Western ‘universal values’: freedom, democracy, human rights and hedonist individualism. The ultimate enemy is not capitalism as such but the rootless Western culture threatening China through the free flow of the internet. It must be fought with Chinese patriotism; even religion should be ‘sinicised’ to ensure social stability. A Communist Party official in Xinjiang, Zhang Chunxian, said recently that while ‘hostile forces’ are stepping up their infiltration, religions must work under socialism to serve economic development, social harmony, ethnic unity and the unification of the country: ‘Only when one is a good citizen can one be a good believer.’
今日所谓”社会主义“的一个例子就是中国。中国共产党正在进行一场”自我合法化“的运动，这个运动的口号有三条【1】共产党的一党统治可确保资本主义（经济）的成功。【2】无神论的共产党统治可以保证真正的宗教自由。【3】共产党统治的延续，可以保证中国社会儒家价值观得以保留（社会和谐，爱国主义，道德观，等等）。共产党的这些话并非空穴来风。因为：【1】如果没有党的稳定权力，资本主义的运动会导致各种混乱和抗议。【2】宗教之间的冲突会影响社会稳定【3】恣意妄为的个人享乐主义会侵蚀社会和谐。这里的第三点是很关键的。因为【3】背后隐藏的是对西方腐蚀性”普世价值“观的恐惧。与”普世价值“相关的，是自由，民主，人权，以及个人享乐主义。（对党来说）最要命的敌人不是资本主义自身，而是发散性的西方文化，通过自由流通的互联网，祸害中国。因此，一定要采用”爱国主义“来作为抗衡的手段。即便是宗教也要被”中国化“来保证社会稳定。新疆维吾尔自治区委员会书记张春贤（李修平的老公）曾说”此时敌对势力正在加大渗透和破坏，宗教一定要同社会主义一起为经济发展，社会和谐，民族团结，国家统一服务。首先做一个好公民，才能做一个好教民” （张春贤，好公民，好教民，见
http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2015/06-15/7343385.shtml）
But this ‘sinicisation’ of religion isn’t enough: any religion, no matter how ‘sinicised’, is incompatible with membership of the Communist Party. An article in the newsletter of the party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection claims that since it is a ‘founding ideological principle that Communist Party members cannot be religious’, party members don’t enjoy the right to religious freedom: ‘Chinese citizens have the freedom of religious belief, but Communist Party members are not the same as regular citizens; they are fighters in the vanguard for a communist consciousness.’ How does this exclusion of believers from the party aid religious freedom? Marx’s analysis of the political imbroglio of the French Revolution of 1848 comes to mind. The ruling Party of Order was the coalition of the two royalist wings, the Bourbons and the Orleanists. The two parties were, by definition, unable to find a common denominator in their royalism, since one cannot be a royalist in general, only a supporter of a particular royal house, so the only way for the two to unite was under the banner of the ‘anonymous kingdom of the Republic’. In other words, the only way to be a royalist in general is to be a republican. The same is true of religion. One cannot be religious in general: one can only believe in a particular god, or gods, to the detriment of others. The failure of all attempts to unite religions shows that the only way to be religious in general is under the banner of the ‘anonymous religion of atheism’. Effectively, only an atheist regime can guarantee religious tolerance: the moment this atheist frame disappears, factional struggle among different religions will explode. Although fundamentalist Islamists all attack the godless West, the worst struggles go on between them (IS focuses on killing Shia Muslims).
但这种宗教“中国化”还不够：任何宗教，无论如何“中国化”都与中国共产党党员的身份发生冲突。中纪委通报中的一篇文章曾指出，因为“最基本的意识形态原则”问题，中共党员不允许信教，进而党员不享有宗教自由的权利。“中国公民享有宗教自由，但党员不是普通公民，他们是共产主义意识先锋队里的战士。” 这种把宗教信徒排除在党外的做法怎么能对宗教自由有所帮助呢？这里可以借鉴一下马克思对1848年法国大革命中政治纠纷的分析。站统治地位的“秩序党”是由两个保皇派成的，波旁派和奥尔良派。这两个党派，基于自身保皇派的本质，是无法找到调和的可能的。因为一个保皇者不能仅仅是宽泛意义上的，必须是某一皇室的支持者。所以这两个保皇派唯有统一在一个旗帜下面“匿名王国共和国”。换个角度说，成为保皇党的唯一途径是做一名共和党。宗教也是如此。一个人不能是宽泛意义上的信徒：你必须要信某个特殊的神灵，或众神，以与其他信仰者有所区别。历史上所有试图统一宗教的努力都是失败的，而这些失败表明：要想具有宗教的普遍性，唯有打着“匿名宗教的无神论”旗帜之下才行。只有持无神论主义的政权才能行之有效得确保宗教平等：一旦（占统治地位的）无神论框架消失，宗教之间的摩擦和冲突就会爆发。（例如）虽然所有原教旨主义的穆斯林势力都在攻击神性泯灭的西方世界，但最残酷的斗争发生在这些势力之间（“穆斯林国”专注于杀光什叶派穆斯林）。
There is, however, a deeper fear at work in the prohibition of religious belief for members of the Communist Party. ‘It would have been best for the Chinese Communist Party if its members were not to believe in anything, not even in communism,’ Zorana Baković, the China correspondent for the Slovenian newspaper Delo, wrote recently, ‘since numerous party members joined churches (most of them Protestant churches) precisely because of their disappointment at how even the smallest trace of their communist ideals had disappeared from today’s Chinese politics.’
而共产党禁党员信教的行为之下，隐藏着一种更深刻的恐慌。“对中共来说，其成员最好啥也不信，连共产主义也不信。”一个女记者最近写道（Zorana Baković，斯洛文尼亚报纸Delo的驻华记者）“大量的党员开始加入教会，以基督教新教为主，因为他们不满于今日中国政治之中已经见不到丝毫共产主义的理念。”
In short, the most serious opposition to the Chinese party leadership today is presented by truly convinced communists, a group composed of old, mostly retired party cadres who feel betrayed by the unbridled capitalist corruption along with those proletarians whom the ‘Chinese miracle’ has failed: farmers who have lost their land, workers who have lost their jobs and wander around searching for a means of survival, others who are exploited by companies like Foxconn etc. They often take part in mass protests carrying placards bearing quotes from Mao. This combination of experienced cadres and the poor who have nothing to lose is potentially explosive. China is not a stable country with an authoritarian regime that guarantees harmony and is thus able to keep capitalist dynamics under control: every year thousands of rebellions of workers, farmers and minorities have to be squashed by the authorities. No wonder official propaganda talks incessantly of a harmonious society. This very insistence bears witness to its opposite, the ever present threat of chaos and disorder. One should apply the basic rule of Stalinist hermeneutics here: since the official media do not openly report on the troubles, the most reliable way to detect them is to search for the positive excesses in state propaganda – the more harmony is celebrated, the more chaos and antagonism should be inferred. China is full of antagonisms and barely controlled instabilities that continually threaten to explode.
总之，此时批评中共领导最严厉的，是一群真正信仰坚定的共产党员。他们大都由退休的党员老干部们组成，失控的资本主义腐败现象对他们来说是一种背叛。还有那些被“中国奇迹”（经济上的）抛弃的无产者：失去土地的农民，下岗的工人，流离失所，艰难求生。还包括被富士康剥削的那些流水线组装工们。正是这些人组成了大规模的示威，打着标语，上面写着毛泽东的著名口号。这种老干部与穷光蛋们的组合好像隐藏的炸弹。中国社会不稳定，专制的政权无法确保社会和谐，无法控制资本主义的各种破坏力：每年都有成千上万的工人，农民和弱势群体造反后，被当局镇压。也难怪媒体里充满了对“和谐社会”无休止的官方宣传。而也正是这种持之以恒的宣传，反过来，印证了社会上各种骚乱的存在。这里应该把斯大林模式的宣传模式反过来分析：因为官方媒体不公开报道骚乱，所以检测是否有骚乱的最好办法是寻找官方正面宣传的“过度”之处，越是粉饰太平，反证出现实中发生的骚乱就越多。此时的中国社会中充满了内乱的因素，当局几乎无法控制，局面一触即发。
It is only against this background that one can understand the religious politics of the Chinese Party: the fear of belief is effectively the fear of communist ‘belief’, the fear of those who remain faithful to the universal emancipatory message of communism. One looks in vain at the ongoing ideological campaign for any mention of the basic class antagonism made evident in the workers’ protests. There is no talk of the threat of ‘proletarian communism’; all the fury is directed instead against the foreign enemy. ‘Certain countries in the West,’ the party secretary of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences wrote in June 2014,
只有理解到这一层的社会大背景问题，我们才能真正理解中共的宗教政策: 真正让党害怕的，是真正的共产主义信仰自身，真正让人畏惧的，是那些依然坚信共产主义普遍解放意义信仰的人。虽然此时中国工人的抗议活动是最好的阶级斗争的案例，但在官方现行的意识形态宣传活动中却只字未提。看不到任何关于“无产阶级共产主义”的话，所有的愤怒都被转移到“敌对势力”身上。“西方某些国家”， 一位中国社会科学院党书记（王伟光）2014年写到：
advertise their own values as ‘universal values’, and claim that their interpretations of freedom, democracy and human rights are the standard by which all others must be measured. They spare no expense when it comes to hawking their goods and peddling their wares to every corner of the planet, and stir up ‘colour revolutions’ both before and behind the curtain. Their goal is to infiltrate, break down and overthrow other regimes. At home and abroad certain enemy forces make use of the term ‘universal values’ to smear the Chinese Communist Party, socialism with Chinese characteristics, and China’s mainstream ideology. They scheme to use Western value systems to change China, with the goal of letting Chinese people renounce the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership and socialism with Chinese characteristics, and allow China to once again become a colony of some developed capitalist country.
西方某些国家把他们的那套价值观念标榜为“普世价值”，把他们诠释的自由、民主、人权等说成是放之四海而皆准的标尺，极力在世界范围内叫卖和推销，台前幕后策动了一场又一场“颜色革命”，其目的就在于渗透、破坏和颠覆别国政权。国内外一些敌对势力假借“普世价值”之名，抹黑中国共产党，抹黑中国特色社会主义制度，抹黑我国主流意识形态，企图用西方价值观念改造中国，其目的也就在于让中国人民放弃中国共产党的领导，放弃中国特色社会主义制度，使中国再次沦为某些发达资本主义国家的殖民地。
（王伟光讲话，见
http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2014...1106051.htm）
Some of this is true, but the particular truths cover over a more general lie. It is of course right that one cannot and should not trust the Western powers’ promulgation of the ‘universal values’ of freedom, democracy and human rights: that universality is false, and conceals the West’s ideological biases. Even so, is it then enough to oppose Western values with a particular alternative, such as the Confucianism that is ‘China’s mainstream ideology’? Don’t we need a different universalism, a different project of universal emancipation? The irony here is that ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ effectively means socialism with capitalist characteristics, i.e. a socialism that fully integrates China into the global market. The universality of global capitalism is left intact, quietly accepted as the only possible frame; the project of Confucian harmony is mobilised only in order to keep a lid on the antagonisms that come along with global capitalist dynamics. All that remains is a socialism with Confucian ‘national colours’: a national socialism, whose social horizon is the patriotic promotion of one’s own nation, while the antagonisms immanent in capitalist development are projected onto a foreign enemy who poses a threat to social harmony. What the Chinese party aims at in its patriotic propaganda, what it calls ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’, is yet another version of ‘alternative modernity’: capitalism without class struggle.
王伟光的话是部分真实的，但这些局部的真实却试图掩盖更大的谎言。我们不能也不应该相信西方霸权散布的普世价值，普世民主，普世人权：所谓“普世"中的“普遍性”是假的，西方世界是在用所谓“普世”来掩盖自己意识形态上的偏见。但即使如此，在反西方价值观的时候，用某个特定的替代品，比如孔老二这个“中国主流意识形态”就够啦？难道我们更需要的，不是一种“不同的普世”么？一种截然不同的具有普遍解放意义的计划么？（张三注：齐泽克这里的意思是，不要让西方世界独占“普世”这个概念，要重新定义新的“普世”含义，而不是停留在老的“普世”定义圈子里）。颇具讽刺意义的是，所谓”中国特色社会主义“实际上就是资本主义特色的社会主义，一种把中国完全融入全球市场的社会主义。（在这个融入过程中）全球化资本主义的普遍性毫发未损，被默默地认同为唯一可行的（经济）框架。而之推行孔老二的”和谐社会“论的唯一目的只是为了掩盖全球化资本主义运动产生的社会内部斗争。最终导致的，是一个带有儒教国家色彩的所谓社会主义：国家社会主义。 （张三注：这里齐泽克使了个坏，因为”国家社会主义“也即”纳粹“
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nazism , 他在暗示中共的纳粹化）。 而这个“主义”所追求的是充满爱国主义情怀的对自己“国家”的宣扬， 同时，把资本主义模式发展必然带来的社会内部斗争“投射”到威胁社会和谐的“敌对势力”身上去。在其爱国主义的宣传伴随下，中共的真正目的是推行所谓“中国特色的社会主义”，但这只不过是另一种所谓的“现代化”而已：没有阶级斗争的资本主义。
附注：翻译到一半儿的时候，发现网上有一篇“齐泽克学会”（香港）的中文翻译，见
http://zizeksociety.blogspot.com/201...sation-01.html 但促读之下，觉得译者因为居住在香港或台湾的原因，很多词汇和语句的翻译不准确。